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APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS TO EVALUATE THE 
SUGGESTIVENESS OF A CHILD-WITNESS INTERVIEW: 
A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A child’s memory is different from an adult’s memory.  It is more 
malleable and more easily influenced by such innocuous acts as asking if 
something occurred.  Simply asking a child if an event occurred will increase 
the chance that the child will later say that the event occurred, even if it did 
not.1  While this may be a “cute” phenomenon among children in everyday 
life, it is certainly not “cute” when the child is a witness to a serious crime or is 
alleged to be a witness to a serious crime.  An interviewer can implant a false 
“memory” of an event into a child’s mind by simply asking about it.2 
Often, for child sexual abuse cases, the child is not just a key witness, the 
child is the only witness.3  However, this evidence can be tainted during the 
investigative process by well-meaning but poorly trained interviewers.  
Problems can arise when the interviewer uses suggestive techniques that cause 
the child to truly believe events happened that did not actually happen.  To 
avoid such possibilities, many safeguards are currently in place, such as 
rigorous training for child witness interviewers; however, problems can still 
arise.  Problems can stem from such obviously suggestive techniques as telling 
the child that other children are reporting that an event occurred and rewarding 
the child for also saying such event occurred,4 to methods as subtle as simply 
asking if an event occurred.  When such problems arise, some courts now have 
sanctioned pretrial “taint hearings” to gauge the suggestiveness of these 
 
 1. DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A 
GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 54 (1998) (citing D.A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Interviewing 
Preschoolers: Effects of Non-suggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and Leading Questions 
on Reports of Non-experienced Events,  J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 60, 129–154 (June 
1995)). 
 2. Id. (citing D.A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing 
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced 
Study Institute (June 1996)). 
 3. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994) (citing United States v. Wade, 338 
U.S. 218, 229 (1967)); DIANE E. PAPALIA & SALLY WENDKOS OLDS, A CHILD’S WORLD: 
INFANCY THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 363 (7th ed. 1996). 
 4. Such techniques have been used and were used to convict a schoolteacher in New Jersey.  
See infra pp. 515-18 and notes 137–65. 
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interviews.5  The trial judge presides over these hearings and decides whether 
the transcripts of the interview and the child’s testimony should be admitted 
into evidence.  This is, for obvious reasons, a very important decision.  Often 
the decision to prosecute such an offender is based on the admissibility of the 
child’s testimony.  Deciding whether or not an interview has been conducted 
suggestively requires knowledge of psychology, statistics, experimental 
methods, and child development that most trial judges do not possess.  An 
adjudicator trained in these technical fields should be appointed to decide these 
issues.  Such a trained adjudicator is referred to as a “special master.” 
Deciding if an interview was so suggestive that the child’s memory is 
irreparably distorted and the child should not be allowed to testify in court is a 
difficult decision that will often turn on a multitude of subtle technical issues.  
A special master, trained in these issues, is better equipped to decide, and 
should decide, such an issue when so much hangs in the balance.  The 
possibility exists that an untrained judge might exclude a valid interview based 
on the testimony from an expert for the defense or that an untrained judge 
might admit into evidence an interview conducted suggestively. 
Part II of this Comment consists of background information and a 
historical overview of the problem of the suggestibility of children in the 
investigative setting.  Part III details the psychological research in the area of 
suggestibility of children during interviews.  Part III also sets forth real-world 
examples of the effects of suggestive questioning of children.  Part IV provides 
an analysis of the various proposed solutions to the problem of suggestibility 
of children, including the response of psychological scholars and courts.  Part 
V concludes that New Jersey’s solution of taint hearings should be conducted 
by specially trained adjudicators.  Part V also outlines the procedure that 
should be followed for the appointment of such an adjudicator. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN 
A. Psychological Research: An Analogy to Witness Interviewing 
Perhaps the greatest confound6 to any experiment involving people is the 
situation in which the people realize the goal of the researcher and “play[] 
 
 5. People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); Michaels, 642 A.2d 
at 1382. 
 6. Confounds, or “confounding variables,” are variables that are unintentionally 
manipulated and produce some effect during an experiment along with the treatment.  MARK 
MITCHELL & JANINA JOLLEY, RESEARCH DESIGN EXPLAINED 220 (3d ed. 1996).  For purposes 
of this discussion, the “hypothesis-guessing” confounding variable is most applicable.  Id. at 221.  
When an experimental group has guessed what effect is “supposed” to occur, it creates an 
impurity in the measurement of the variables.  Id.  Basically, the experiment begins to measure 
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along.”7  A person who has realized the researcher’s goal will tend to answer 
the researcher’s questions in a manner the person believes is desired by the 
researcher.8  For this reason, most psychological studies are designed so that 
the subject9 and even the researcher are unaware of the hypothesis.10  These 
dangers are present when a police officer is interviewing a child regarding 
criminal activity.11  However, it would be virtually impossible to eliminate the 
researcher’s and child’s awareness of the reason for the encounter.12  Although 
the situations involved during a criminal interview and a psychological 
experiment are clearly not identical, the analogy is equally clear.  As a child 
picks up on an interviewer’s goals, ideas, or biases,13 the likelihood that the 
child will try to answer “correctly,” by telling the interviewer what the child 
believes the interviewer wants to hear, increases.14  Because of this threat that a 
child interviewee will discover the reason for the encounter and try to please 
the interviewer by answering as desired, there is considerable reason to attempt 
to reduce another confound of the interview process: the suggestiveness of the 
interview, particularly for a child interviewee.15 
 
the effect from the treatment as well as how much the experimental group has figured out the 
hypothesis. 
 7. Id. at 9, 57. 
 8. Id.  This effect is generally well-accepted among psychological researchers as a threat to 
the construct validity, the extent to which a study is actually manipulating and measuring what it 
claims to be manipulating and measuring, of an experiment.  Id. at 8–9.  The threat is that when a 
subject realizes the experimenter’s goal, the answers given will no longer measure the desired 
information, but rather how much the subject has learned the hypothesis.  See id. at 17–20.  For 
an extensive analysis of construct validity and psychological research in general see MITCHELL & 
JOLLEY, supra note 6. 
 9. Id. at 180.  This is referred to as a “blind study.”  Id. 
 10. Id. at 73.  This is usually achieved by commissioning another person, unaware of the 
goal of the research, to gather the data.  Id.  If either the subject or the researcher is unaware of 
the goal, it is a “single blind” study; if both are unaware of the goal it is “double blind.”  Id. at 
180.  This effect of knowledge of an experiment’s goal is quite powerful; it is often the basis for 
double-blind testing of new, experimental drugs, to be sure a patient’s improvement is due to the 
drug and not his or her belief that the drug will work.  Id. at 73. 
 11. See PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363. 
 12. While it may be true that a child would not realize, at first, why he or she is being 
questioned, it is equally true that the interviewer would know why he is speaking to the child and 
eventually, if the interview is to be productive at all, the child will realize why he or she is being 
questioned. 
 13. The form of the interview questions is the most obvious way to introduce such bias, 
however, it can stem from the interviewer’s tone of voice, facial expressions, or an overall 
accusatory context of the interview.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INTERVIEWING CHILD WITNESSES 
AND VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 2 (4th prtg. 2002) [hereinafter DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET]. 
 14. See POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 67. 
 15. For an exhaustive discussion of the suggestibility and believability of trauma survivors 
in general, as well as the effects of trauma on the human mind, see TRAUMA & MEMORY (Linda 
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Young children are particularly susceptible to suggestive questions; 
therefore, there can be danger implicit in an improperly conducted interview of 
a child.16  Child abuse is a crime that must often rely almost exclusively on the 
testimony of the child reporting it.17  This implicates a “major social policy” 
concern.18  Adults who abuse children must be held responsible, but incorrect 
testimony could subject innocent adults to extreme punishment.19  While the 
actual number of false allegations20 is highly contentious, the implications are 
clear: There is a very real possibility that innocent adults are being punished 
for sexual abuse that never occurred and, because of the dilemma of suggestive 
interviews of children, guilty adults are going unpunished when the only 
evidence against them, a child’s statements, is not admitted at trial.21  The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey stepped forward to address the former problem 
directly and indirectly addressed the latter problem.22 
B. Courts Begin to Take into Consideration the Suggestibility of Children 
 
M. Williams & Victoria L. Baynard eds., 1999).  This paper focuses on the legal issues 
surrounding the suggestibility of children interviewees, which tends to increase as the age of the 
child decreases.  See PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363 (citing Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie 
Bruck, Child Witnesses: Translating Research into Policy, SOCIAL POL’Y REPORT, Fall 1993, at 
7). 
 16. Martine B. Powell et al., The Effects of Repeated Experience on Children’s 
Suggestibility, 35 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1462, 1462–77 (1999). 
 17. PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363.  Child abuse is “a crime that by its nature is often 
without corroboration” beyond the child’s testimony.  Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, 
Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403, 
408 (1993) [hereinafter Historical Review]. 
 18. PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363. 
 19. Id. 
 20. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 18.  False allegations, explicit allegations of abuse that 
are false, are believed to occur by most researchers.  Id. at 17–19.  The reasons for such beliefs 
range from suggestive interview procedures, to a child’s desire to live with one parent in a 
custody hearing, to bribes.  Id.  The numbers are equally varied; obviously no exact number will 
ever be calculated.  However, estimates range from 5% to 35% of all reported abuse cases.  Id. at 
17–18. 
 21. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994).  Kelly Michaels, a college 
student who was working at a day care, is one possible example.  She is either an innocent person 
subjected to a trial for child abuse spanning two years and who served five years of a forty-seven 
year sentence before a New Jersey Appellate Division Court reversed her conviction due to 
“unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by improper investigative procedures,” State v. 
Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), or she is a child abuser who was 
set free forty-two years early because of the same “unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by 
improper investigative procedures.”  Id.  Regardless of what the correct answer is, the case of 
Kelly Michaels is clearly a tragedy. 
 22. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382.  More accurately, discerning the suggestive interviews also 
makes it easier to discern the nonsuggestive interviews. 
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In State v. Michaels, the court recognized that “[i]f a child’s recollection of 
events has been molded by an interrogation, that influence undermines the 
reliability of the child’s responses as an accurate recollection of actual 
events.”23  The court held that when an interview is so tainted by the 
interviewer, the transcripts (and other evidence) of such interviews may be 
inadmissible at trial.24  Further, the court held that a tainted interview could 
even cause the child’s in-court testimony to be excluded at trial.25  The 
Michaels court, therefore, held “that to ensure defendant’s right to a fair trial a 
pretrial taint hearing is essential to demonstrate the reliability of the . . . 
evidence [obtained during an interview of a child].”26  While New Jersey’s 
idea of taint hearings has not been widely accepted,27 courts often accept the 
reasoning as valid,28 and at least one state, New York, has employed the use of 
a Michaels taint hearing.29  The resistance to taint hearings is mostly based on 
resistance to psychology experts as “soft scientists”30 and judges’ beliefs that 
the credibility of witnesses is in the sole discretion of themselves and juries, 
regardless of the subtle science involved in the suggestibility of children.31  
 
 23. Id. at 1377.  For a detailed discussion of the facts of Michaels see infra pp. 516-19. 
 24. Id. at 1380 (ignoring, for the time being, any possible hearsay problems). 
 25. Id. at 1382. 
 26. Id.  The form of this pretrial taint hearing involves two stages of burden-shifting, which 
ultimately requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a child’s testimony is 
reliable.  See infra pp. 524-25 and notes 217–30. 
 27. Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Dec. 11, 2002) (holding that Alaska has never adopted Michaels and that the defendant in this 
case had ample opportunity to present the evidence of suggestibility to the judge and jury at trial); 
Commonwealth v. D.J.A, 800 A.2d 965, 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (rejecting a Michaels taint 
hearing and expert testimony as to the credibility of child witnesses); State v. Olah, 767 N.E.2d 
755,760 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that it is no error to deny a defendant a pretrial taint 
hearing); In re Dependency of A.E.P., 956 P.2d 297, 304 (Wash. 1998) (holding that any attack 
on the credibility of a child witness can be addressed by a court during the competency hearing; 
therefore, no separate taint hearing is required); cf. Ardolino v. Warden, Maine State Prison, 223 
F.Supp.2d 215, 238–39 (D. Me. 2002) (reviewing the history of Michaels and stating that it is 
unlikely the reasoning would prevail in Maine). 
 28. English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 146 (Wyo. 1999) (agreeing with the logic of Michaels, 
yet finding no place for a taint hearing in Wyoming law). 
 29. People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 177–78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that a 
hearing should be held to determine if a child was subject to an unduly suggestive or coercive 
interview and if the testimony is therefore unreliable); Julie A. Jablonski, Where has Michaels 
Taken Us?: Assessing the Future of Taint Hearings, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 49, 57–
58 (1998) (noting that the trend of cases seems to be developing toward acceptance of taint 
hearings). 
 30. See Emily L. Baggett, Note, The Standard Applied to the Admission of Soft Science 
Experts in State Courts, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149, 155 (2002). 
 31. English, 982 P.2d at 145 (“[O]nce the child’s competency is called into question by 
either party, it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to 
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While there has been some resistance to Michaels among legal scholars,32 the 
idea of taint hearings seems reasonable to many authors33 and has been 
heralded as a societal good by others.34 
Regardless of the perceived propriety or impropriety of the Michaels 
decision35 or its acceptance among legal scholars, the fact remains that at least 
some jurisdictions are conducting taint hearings for children alleging abuse36 
and acceptance of the principles in Michaels by more jurisdictions seems 
imminent.37  This Comment does not debate the propriety of taint hearings but 
rather will address the procedure that should be adopted for taint hearings in 
jurisdictions that currently, or in the future will, employ them.  With so much 
 
determine competency.”); Bourdon, 2002 WL 31761482, at *2 (holding that a criminal defendant 
can raise the issue of suggestiveness on motion at trial before or after the child’s testimony has 
been admitted).  The Bourdon court has clearly disregarded the effect such testimony would have 
on jurors and the near impossibility of the jury disregarding such testimony even if told it was 
suggestive and should be disregarded. 
 32. Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
479, 543 (1997) (“We need desperately to overcome the efforts to let abuse go unaddressed by the 
legal system, and resist the campaign to discount or submerge these criminal acts.”); Lisa 
Manshel, The Child Witness and the Presumption of Authenticity After State v. Michaels, 26 
SETON HALL L. REV. 685, 762–63 (1996) (arguing that Michaels permits a defendant to 
overcome easily the presumption of a a child’s truthfulness and that children should be allowed to 
testify regardless of the suggestibility of their interviews and the jury should decide their 
credibility); John E.B. Myers, Taint hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction, 
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 873, 877 (1994) (“[T]he New Jersey court’s decision breaks new and 
troubling ground.”). 
 33. Thomas D. Lyon, Applying Suggestibility Research to the Real World: The Case of 
Repeated Questions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 126 (2002) (concluding that while the 
research on children’s suggestibility has undoubtedly done good, that within the confines of the 
adversarial system the research could do great harm and may be more likely to mislead than 
educate); see also Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: 
Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 87 (2000) (reasoning that 
children should be allowed to testify in all but the most extreme cases of suggestiveness). 
 34. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 58–63 (arguing that the trend is toward accepting the 
Michaels decision and that jurisdictions that do not follow Michaels do so on weak reasoning, 
contrary to precedent, and do not address the issue); Karol L. Ross, State v. Michaels: A New 
Jersey Supreme Court Ruling with National Implications, 78 MICH. B. J. 32, 35 (1999) (arguing 
that the Michaels decision is proper for a civilized society that claims to protect constitutional 
rights for all parties). 
 35. Although the debate as to the propriety of Michaels is intense, once one accepts that 
some jurisdictions conduct these taint hearings, one’s attention should turn to how these taint 
hearings are conducted. 
 36. E.g., People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); State v. Michaels, 
642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994). 
 37. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 57–58. 
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at stake during taint hearings,38 a taint hearing is certainly an exceptional 
circumstance for which the presiding judge should have a firm understanding 
of the complex psychological issues at play during child-witness interviews.  
However, the jurisdictions that allow taint hearings require the trial judge to 
preside over the hearing.39  The issues involved here require special expertise 
in the psychology of interviewing (or at least training in the social sciences, 
experimental design, and statistics),40 which is simply outside the ken of most 
judges.41  Therefore, when a trial court has deemed it necessary to conduct a 
taint hearing, this hearing should be presided over by an impartial judge with 
special training and special expertise in this technical and hotly contested area 
of psychology.42  Such a technically trained adjudicator is often referred to as a 
“special master.”43  This Comment will follow suit. 
III.  PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
 
 38. As discussed, supra, the stakes are clear: innocent adults punished as child sex offenders 
or child sex offenders freed as innocent adults.  One need only consider the case of Kelly 
Michaels to be assured of the exceptional circumstances in play here.  Historical Review, supra 
note 17, at 403–04. 
 39. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 810–11; Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1384–85. 
 40. Although judges often state that judging the credibility is solely within their discretion or 
the discretion of the jury, despite any suggestive interview techniques, the multitude of guides 
published to aid in the interview of children, e.g., INTERVENING IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
(Kathleen Murray & David A. Gough eds. 1991); DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13; 
POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, and the proliferation of research published in this field, see 
generally, Historical Review, supra note 17, at 403; Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, would seem to 
suggest that the suggestibility of children is not within the ken of the average judge or juror. 
 41. While the proportion of judges with degrees in psychology has not been compiled, the 
statistics for incoming first year students at law school is indicative of the background of 
attorneys, which is ultimately the pool from which judges are selected.  Most statistics do not 
even have a “psychology” category of its own and such majors are lumped into the “other” 
category or the “sciences” category.  See SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 2003–2004 
CATALOG 2 (2003) (“other” undergraduate majors totaling 1.8%); PROFILE OF THE STUDENT 
BODY, Boston College Law School, at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/admission/profile/ (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2004) (“science” undergraduate majors totaling 8%).  The schools that have a 
“psychology” undergraduate category are in the 5% range of law students with a psychology 
undergraduate degree.  CLASS PROFILE, Columbia Law School, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
prosp_students/jd_prog/applic_inf/Class_Profile (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); ADMISSIONS 
PROFILE, University of Cincinnati Law, at http://www.law.uc.edu/admissions/majors.html (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2004). “[T]his research area is developing rapidly and is riddled with a host of 
complex issues that necessitate a broad understanding of design, statistics, and theory not likely 
possessed by someone outside the research community.”  Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at page 
19. 
 42. See Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19. 
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 53; see also National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
(2000); Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2000); Civil Rights Act or 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2000); People v. Superior Court (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 584 (Cal. 2001). 
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There is an immense amount of research regarding the suggestibility of 
child witnesses,44 and there is an equally immense amount of commentary 
regarding this research.45  The research is “developing rapidly” and is “riddled 
with a host of complex issues” that necessitate such a “broad understanding of 
design, statistics, and theory not likely possessed by someone outside the 
research community” that an exhaustive review would be impossible.46  The 
context of greatest concern regards the issue of rates of false positives and false 
negatives of abuse.47  “[A] false positive is the error that arises when abuse did 
not occur but the system concludes that it did, and a false negative is the 
corresponding error that arises when abuse did occur but the system concludes 
that it did not.”48  These errors are of obvious concern to our legal system: A 
false positive possibly subjects an innocent person to some of the harshest 
penalties of our legal system,49 while a false negative frees a dangerous person 
to possibly harm another child.  There are obviously extremes on either side of 
the false positive/false negative argument.50  However, it should be apparent 
that both of these situations present a grave injustice.  The question then 
becomes to what extent our legal system is designed to prefer one type of false 
report over another. 
 
 44. See, e.g., Powell et al., supra note 16; Yael Orbach & Michael Lamb, Enhancing 
Children’s Narratives in Investigative Interviews, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1631 (2000); 
Ann-Christin Cederborg et al., Investigative Interviews of Child Witnesses in Sweden, 24 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1355 (2000); Michael E. Lamb & Kathleen J. Sternberg, Conducting 
Investigative Interviews of Alleged Sexual Abuse Victims, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 813 
(1998).  See generally Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15; Historical Review, supra note 17. 
 45. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33; Henderson, supra note 32; Lyon, supra note 33. 
 46. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19. 
 47. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 71.  While there are any number of applications of 
this research to other interview contexts, this paper focuses on the issue of self-reported abuse 
against children.  Additionally, there are many ways in which a child could provide false 
information, which are of little importance to the issue of false positive or false negative reports 
of abuse, such as the reporting of untrue “peripheral details.”  Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 
1634.  Peripheral details are defined as “details about [an] incident [of abuse], which [are] not 
allegation-specific or plot related,” such as the color of the defendant’s shirt.  Id.  Obviously, it is 
possible to report such things falsely, but whether a defendant’s shirt was blue usually has little to 
do with the defendant’s guilt. 
 48. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 71. 
 49. Id. at 75–76 (“A false conviction in a child sexual abuse case may have some 
particularly nasty consequences, including destruction of a family and exposure of the defendant 
to intense public opprobrium and even physical danger.” (citations omitted)).  Additionally “a 
child abuse finding against a parent or parents where no abuse has occurred is as harmful and 
devastating to the subject child as is the failure to find child abuse where such has occurred.”  Id. 
at 75 n.216 (quoting In re Smith, 509 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986)). 
 50. Some seem to argue that any attempt to uncover false positives is an example of how 
“the criminal law continues to disadvantage the relatively powerless and perpetuate the dominant 
ideologies of the powerful.”  Henderson, supra note 32, at 479. 
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Section A discusses the meaning of the presumption of innocence of a 
criminal defendant and the ramifications this suggests for a preference to 
release a guilty party, rather than convict an innocent party.51  Section B 
outlines some of the laboratory research on the suggestibility of children.52  
Section C gives a detailed explanation of the real world examples of 
suggestibility of children, including an expansive look at the facts of 
Michaels.53 
A. The Presumption of Innocence 
An initial issue must be discussed before first delving into the matter of the 
values our legal system places on false positives or false negatives.  The issue 
is the “goal” of researchers in this field.  While some have argued that the 
research is “pro-child abuser” or “pro-defendant,”54 one should consider the 
ramifications of such research and the values to be discussed in this section, 
before concluding that the research is “pro-child abuser.”  First, a large amount 
of the research in this area is focused on the creation of a nonsuggestive 
protocol for the interview of children.55  This “protocol research” is designed 
to decrease both false positives and false negatives.56  Second, the “protocol 
research” tries to reduce the risk that children’s testimony will not be believed 
and that guilty abusers will then be set free.57  Research has shown that jurors 
 
 51. See infra, pp. 507. 
 52. See infra, pp. 509. 
 53. See infra, pp. 516. 
 54. Henderson, supra note 32. 
 55. E.g., Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1633.  One such example is the work of Doctors 
Yael Orbach and Michael Lamb at the National Institutes of Child Health and Human 
Development (NICHD), in Bethesda, Maryland, and their “NICHD Investigative Protocol.”  Id.  
The NICHD Investigative Protocol was developed to promote nonsuggestive interviews of 
children.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 1631–33.  Less suggestive questioning has been shown to increase both the detail 
provided by children and the accuracy of this detail.  Id. at 1631–32.  Suggestive questions, and 
even simple “yes/no” questions, tend to increase the likelihood of false information, probably 
because children are more likely to guess at “yes/no” questions and to acquiesce to the 
interviewer’s suggestive questions.  Id. at 1632.  Therefore, the use of nonsuggestive questions to 
elicit more correct answers decreases the risk of false positives or false negatives, by getting at 
the truth more accurately. 
 57. See id. at 1633.  During a press conference held after a jury had acquitted a defendant of 
sexual abuse, many jurors claimed that “they believed that some of the children had been abused, 
but were unable to reach a guilty verdict because of the suggestive way the kids had been 
interviewed.”  Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 2.  It seems clear that at least some jurors, then, 
will find a child’s story insufficient to convict a defendant if the child’s story was elicited in a 
suggestive manner.  “[O]nly improvement in the average quality of investigative interviews are 
[sic] likely to bring about improvement in our ability to protect children.”  Lamb & Sternberg, 
supra note 44, at 821. 
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are more likely to believe a child’s statements if they are shown to be in 
response to nonsuggestive questions.58  Therefore, the attacks made by 
researchers on suggestive questions can be seen as a warning to prosecutors 
about the dangers that inhere in relying on suggestive techniques to secure 
convictions.59  Finally, when one realizes that the vast majority of researchers 
in this field recognize the dangers of suggestive questions,60 that courts realize 
this danger as well,61 and that suggestive interviews are generally viewed as 
improper,62 one can recognize that there is a very real possibility that 
suggestive interviews will cause an important part of a prosecutor’s evidence 
to be excluded at trial.  Research designed to reduce the suggestiveness of 
child witness interviews can then be seen as an attempt to cause better 
interviews to be conducted and therefore lead to the admission of better 
evidence63 and more of a child’s own thoughts at trial.64  The research aids the 
search for truth by promoting more accurate fact-finding. 
Finally, one must consider that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, 
which applies in all criminal cases, reflects the view that our legal system fears 
the risk of a false positive more than the risk of a false negative.65  The United 
 
 58. See Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 2.  Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, in a rather 
complicated fashion discuss this issue in terms of a “likelihood ratio,” in which jurors inherently 
examine the chance that a claim is true or false.  Id. at 76–81.  A basic premise can be extracted 
that if an interview is suggestive, and the jurors become aware of this, the perceived likelihood 
that an allegation is false will increase and with it increases the likelihood that a child will not be 
believed.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 85. 
 60. Id. at 45 (“Virtually all research in the scientific mainstream . . . pays at least some 
attention to the dangers of both false positives and of false negatives.”); Cederborg et al., supra 
note 44, at 1355 (noting that there is a strong consensus among experts that as much information 
as possible should be elicited by nonsuggestive means). 
 61. E.g., State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377 (N.J. 1994); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 
146 (Wyo. 1999). 
 62. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990). 
 63. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360.  Cederborg, Orbach, Sternberg, and Lamb note 
that suggestive interviews are likely to be inadmissible in court and that they seek to decrease 
suggestibility in interviews to gain more admissible testimony.  Id. 
 64. Id.  The use of suggestive questions is likely to contaminate an interview with the 
interviewer’s ideas, whereas nonsuggestive questions elicit more of the child’s memory.  Id. at 
1359; DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 46.  
For a more complete discussion of suggestive interviews see infra pp. 509-516. 
 65. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital 
role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of conviction resting on factual error.”) (emphasis added).  “The requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure [because] [t]he accused during a 
criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance.”  Id.  The loss of liberty is of 
obvious importance as well as the stigmatization inherent in a criminal conviction, which is 
probably greater in a child abuse case than in any other.  Id.; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33. 
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States Supreme Court in In re Winship66 stated “explicitly . . . that the Due 
Process Clause protects [an] accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”67  The Court found it critical that the “moral force” of 
the law not be diluted by doubt of whether or not “innocent men are being 
condemned.”68  United States Supreme Court precedent reiterates that this 
standard reveals a policy determination that “it is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”69  Without belaboring the point, 
regardless of the propriety of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, this is 
the standard of criminal trials in America, and this suggests a preference to free 
a guilty person rather than convict an innocent person. 
With this preference in mind, it seems that research concerning the 
suggestibility of child witnesses serves at least two constitutional purposes: 
helping to assure the “moral force”70 of our criminal justice system and helping 
to assure a more pure testimonial standard for children used at trial to achieve 
convictions for the guilty.  While one may argue that this standard is “pro-
defendant,”71 this is the constitutional approach72 and any attack on the 
research as “pro-child abuser” ignores the testimonial benefits to children that 
stem from non-suggestive interviews.73  With this in mind, one should look at 
what a suggestive interview consists of. 
B. Examination of the Research on the Suggestibility of Children 
 
 66. 397 U.S. at 364. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 74.  Indeed, 
Ceci & Friedman argue that the Court’s preference to free guilty persons rather than convict 
innocent persons is clear.  In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995), the Court favorably 
quoted THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE 756 (1824), in stating that the standard of “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” reveals a determination that it is better that ninety-nine offenders should go 
free than to convict one innocent man.  Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 74. 
 70. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
 71. This is not the only example of such treatment of defendants in our legal system.  For 
example, consider briefly the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Doctrine, discussed in Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court” or a federal court.  Id. at 
655.  Under the Fourth Amendment, then, even if incriminating evidence is discovered by law-
enforcement officers, that evidence is inadmissible against the defendant.  While this may be 
“pro-defendant,” that is the price paid for constitutional protections. 
 72. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 74. 
 73. Some commentators suggest that believability and admissibility of the child’s testimony 
are two of the most obvious benefits lost.  See, e.g., Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 2; Ceci & 
Friedman, supra note 33, at 76–81; Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360. 
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The history and research about suggestibility of children during interviews 
is immense.74  While an evaluation of the entire body of research on 
suggestibility of children would be impossible, some general principles can be 
derived quite easily.  First, suggestive interviews increase the likelihood that 
unreliable information will be obtained; the likelihood of this result increases 
as the suggestiveness of the interview increases.75  What constitutes a 
suggestive interview is a complex issue, involving many factors, including the 
form of the interviewer’s questions,76 repetition of the interviewer’s 
questions,77 the interviewer’s tone of voice and facial expressions,78 the 
general accusatory context of the interview,79 questions that stereotype an 
accused,80 and other factors.81  The rate at which children respond to 
suggestive questions with false positives is not completely clear.  However, 
there is a “strong consensus” among researchers that questions should be 
formed in the least suggestive way possible.82  The research of Gail Goodman, 
purported to be the “scholar most favored by child advocates” for her position 
that false positives rarely occur, has provided “strong evidence that children, 
especially young children, are suggestible to a significant degree.”83 
One group of researchers84 categorizes the form of suggestive questions on 
a continuum of suggestiveness, placing questions in one of four general 
categories.85  Invitations, the least suggestive, consist of utterances, questions, 
 
 74. See Historical Review, supra note 17. 
 75. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 66–69; Lyon, supra note 33, at 113.  Some techniques 
are believed to increase false information by more than fifty percent.  Ceci & Friedman, supra 
note 33, at 54. 
 76. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360; Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1631–33; 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2. 
 77. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 42; Lyon, supra note 33, at 108; POOLE & LAMB, 
supra note 1, at 55–56. 
 78. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2. 
 79. Id.; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 67. 
 80. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 63–64 (specifically addressing the vilification of Kelly 
Michaels by interviewers during the Michaels case). 
 81. Such factors include repeated interviews.  Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 55. 
 82. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1355–56. 
 83. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 46–47.  Goodman’s studies have found that young 
children incorrectly answer misleading questions as often as 40% of the time.  Id. at 50.  The rate 
of incorrect answers is as high as 16% for six- to ten-year-olds and as high as 9%  for eleven- to 
fifteen-year-olds.  Id.  Even Goodman’s lowest rate was about 3%, which is still a substantial risk.  
Id. at 52. 
 84. The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development in Bethesda, Maryland, 
is one such organization.  It is a government-funded research facility. 
 85. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1357.  Ranging from least to most suggestive, 
respectively, the categories are invitations, directive questions, option-posing questions, and 
suggestive questions.  Id. 
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or statements that prompt free-recall of the child.86  Invitations do not limit the 
child’s focus in any way and consist of statements such as: “Tell me everything 
that happened.”87  Directive questions are slightly more suggestive than 
invitations.  These questions provide details about an event that the child has 
already mentioned and ask for more information.88 
Option-posing questions are next.  These questions can be dangerous 
because they provide a child with a limited number of options, or “yes/no” 
answers, such as asking “Did he touch you?” or asking “Did he touch you on 
your arm or leg?”89  Option-posing questions are possibly the most interesting 
and difficult to understand of the suggestive questions.  For example, 
researchers have shown that children are likely to attempt to answer option-
posing questions, regardless of their knowledge of the answer, because they 
feel they are being “helpful” or “cooperative.”90  Experiments in which there 
were no “correct” answers have shown that children will typically choose the 
last option from the choices or, in response to “yes/no” questions, will simply 
say “yes” if the answer is unknown, even if they are explicitly told that it is 
alright to answer with “I do not know.”91  Additionally, even when the correct 
answer is “no,” children are simply more likely to answer “yes/no” questions 
with a “yes” response.92 
Finally, questions that strongly communicate the answer expected, such as 
starting an interview by saying “We know he touched you in a bad place, tell 
us about it,” are defined as suggestive questions.93  Questions that insert 
assumed information are also defined as suggestive, if the child has not 
previously stated the information.94  Perhaps one of the most shocking 
experiments in this area had more than fifty percent of the children producing 
 
 86. Id.  Inviting the child to recall the information without inserting any bias is the key.  Id. 
 87. Id.  Obviously there is some focus to the questioning.  The interviewer should attempt to 
gain that focus non-suggestively, using the child’s guidance. 
 88. Id.  Sometimes called “cued recall,” these questions can become suggestive if the 
interviewer mistakenly asks about events the child has not mentioned.  This suggestiveness 
usually comes from the reality that the interviewer has spoken with others about the abuse and 
knows some of the surrounding facts.  Whether these facts are true or not, it is more reliable to get 
them first from the child, during the interview.  This leads to a less suggestive interview. 
 89. Id.  A child will usually pick one of the limited options, even if it is not true.  The child 
likely thinks that the adult knows the answer and that one of the options is the answer. 
 90. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 53–54. 
 91. Id.  The child, in trying to answer correctly, believes that “I don’t know” is certainly not 
the “correct” answer.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 54.  This concept is probably outside the general knowledge of jurors. 
 93. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1357–58.  These are the questions typically viewed as 
“leading” in legal terms, such as: “He forced you to do that, didn’t he?”  Id at 1357. 
 94. Id.  Even if it is a confirmed fact, the mantra is: Get the child to say it with free recall 
first.  This helps the reliability, both actual and perceived, of the interview.  Id. 
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false narratives about events that never occurred.95  For example, children were 
asked: “Think real hard, and tell me if this ever happened to you.  Do you 
remember going to the hospital with a mousetrap on your finger?”96  Children 
that had never, in fact, had such an experience provided narratives “rich with 
details” and, surprisingly, more than a quarter of the children later refused to 
admit that the event never occurred.97  It is reasonably well-accepted that there 
is a substantial chance of false positives when interviews are conducted with 
suggestive questions, even if the “suggestive question” is simply to ask for a 
“yes/no” answer.  Additionally, researchers tend to agree that free-recall 
questions should be used as much as possible before any option-posing 
questions are used, to avoid contamination of the interview with possible 
inaccuracies caused by “the form of the question.”98 However, research shows 
that interviewers in real-world settings often begin an interview with a 
suggestive question.99 
The dangers of suggestive questions can be exacerbated by repeating 
them.100 While repetition of questions is often allowed in the legal setting,101 
repeating questions during interviews of children presents a couple of specific 
dangers.  First, a child will perceive that he or she has answered “wrong” and 
he or she will try to answer “correctly” by giving a different answer.102  
Second, a child is more susceptible to change his or her answer and acquiesce 
to suggestive questions if they are repeated.103  An interviewer’s tone of voice 
and expression can suggest the “correct” answer to children as well.104  
Although somewhat intuitive, the general communication style an interviewer 
takes can greatly affect the interview.105 
The basic advice to interviewers is that “[t]wo communications styles are 
inappropriate when interviewing children for forensic purposes: talking as if 
they were adults, and talking as if they were children.”106  A skilled interviewer 
should develop a linguistic style that is structured to make sense to children, 
considering their development, social and cultural background, and many other 
 
 95. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 61.  Narratives are stories that sound real.  The child 
sometimes creates “real-sounding” stories to accompany the false answers to these questions.  
Such stories add an element of reality to the answer. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1355–56. 
 99. Id. at 1359. 
 100. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 42; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55–57. 
 101. Subject to the limits for harassment. 
 102. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 56; Lyon, supra note 33, at 108. 
 103. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 56. 
 104. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2. 
 105. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 153. 
 106. Id. 
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linguistic characteristics.107  Certainly such an extensive grasp of linguistic 
communications is beyond the ken of most people, jurors and judges alike. 
An accusatory context or stereotype of the suspected abuser can also lead 
to false positives and increase a child’s susceptibility to suggestive 
questions.108  An accusatory context involves interviewers characterizing the 
behavior of a suspect as “bad” or telling a child that he or she is there to “help 
the interviewer catch the bad people” and attempting to elicit more 
information.109  This will typically cause a child to shade his or her narrative 
towards more and more “bad” behavior of the suspect.110  A stereotype of the 
defendant as a “bad person” can be particularly damaging.  One shocking study 
involved the stereotype of a visitor to a classroom as “clumsy.”111  Children 
falsely reported “clumsiness” as much as seventy-two percent of the time in 
response to suggestive questions when the interviewer had previously 
implanted ideas that a visitor was “clumsy.”112  This can have a particularly 
noticeable effect when stereotypes are implanted outside of the interview 
context, such as by parents during a custody dispute; yet, in that context, it is 
often hard to realize that the stereotypes have been implanted.113  Thus, it 
seems that a suggestive interview can be an elusive concept. 
As a general rule, younger children are more susceptible to suggestive 
techniques.114  Although young children “are capable of preserving and 
accurately reporting memories over time,”115 there are differences between 
young children’s abilities to accurately recall events, mostly regarding their 
ability to focus on specific events.116  However, the most important factor of 
age is that, for all levels of suggestive interviews, the effects are more 
 
 107. Id. at 153–54.  This topic is immense; it encompasses intricate ideas such as an 
understanding of the typical adult-child conversation, language development of children, 
principles of vocabulary and vocabulary development, word syntax, cultural values of body 
language, and other things.  Id. at 153–80.  For an in-depth review of these topics see POOLE & 
LAMB, supra note 1. 
 108. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2–3; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 
61–64.  Sometimes called “interviewer environment” and “social pressure,” the context of an 
interview should not be designed to clearly tell the child why he or she is being interviewed.  Id. 
 109. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 62. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 63 (citing Leictman & Ceci study 1995). 
 112. Id. at 64.  The highest percentage was seventy-two percent for the suggestive interviews; 
however, the “clumsy” stereotype had an effect on all groups.  Id. 
 113. Id.  Stereotypes that the other parent is “bad” can easily be fostered, consciously or 
subconsciously, in these situations, especially if the separation is less than cordial. 
 114. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 7; Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1632. 
 115. Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases, 
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2137 (1996). 
 116. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 35. 
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profound for younger children.117  A confusing issue for this factor is that the 
effect of suggestiveness is based on the general development of the child, not 
specifically his or her age.  Therefore, when considering the suggestiveness of 
an interview, one should consider the development level of a child, a factor 
that is not easily deducible by mere intuition.118  An analysis of the 
suggestiveness, therefore, requires some understanding of the developmental 
stages of children.119  In this context, age of a child will, typically, actually 
refer to the child’s development, more than literally referring to the child’s 
age.120  Research has shown younger children to be more susceptible to 
suggestive questions,121 to be more likely to follow the patterns regarding 
“yes/no” questions,122 and to be more susceptible to stereotypes of 
defendants,123 as well as all the other factors discussed in this section.  
Therefore, while “preschoolers should [not] be deemed incompetent to 
testify . . . the circumstances surrounding their recollections should be 
considered with [their development age] in mind.”124 
Third, it appears that the number of interviews affects the accuracy of a 
child’s answer to questions and also increases the risk that suggestive questions 
will elicit unreliable answers.125  Repetitions of interviews stem from several 
sources.  Often several agencies are involved in the investigation, causing 
fragmentation that leads to multiple interviews.126  There will likely be a need 
to interview a child multiple times as new information becomes available.127  
Further, informal “interviews” by parents or others who want to discuss the 
events with their children function as “repeat interviews.”128  “The impact of 
 
 117. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2137; DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2. 
 118. See generally Powell et al., supra note 16; PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3.  Certainly 
age is typically a good measurement of development of children generally.  Powell et al., supra 
note 16.  However, it is equally certain that not all children develop at the same rate.  PAPALIA & 
OLDS, supra note 3. 
 119. See generally PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 35.  Developmental psychology is 
probably outside the general knowledge of the average juror. 
 120. For example, research that refers to “younger children” or even that uses young age 
groups refer, more accurately, to “less developed children.” 
 121. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 7.  They will, therefore, be more likely to acquiesce to 
the question.  Id. 
 122. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.  They will therefore be more likely to 
choose the last option or say “yes” if they do not know the answer (or even if they do know the 
answer).  POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 53–55. 
 123. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2137–38. 
 124. Id. at 2138. 
 125. Id. at 2144–46; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55–57. 
 126. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2144. 
 127. Id. at 2145. 
 128. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55. 
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repeat[ing] [questions] is not uniform.”129  The effects vary with the number of 
interviews, the intervals between interviews, and the types of questions that are 
repeated.130  As the number of interviews increases, there is simply a greater 
risk that some “improper” questioning will occur, and there is a “greater 
likelihood that a child’s memory . . . is distorted by . . . the interviewer.”131  
Also, as the number of interviews increase, the chance that questions will be 
repeated increases, and as questions are repeated a child is more likely to think 
that previous answers were “wrong” or to acquiesce to an interviewer’s 
suggestiveness.132 
One rather intriguing study involved the effect of “yes/no” questions that 
implanted an idea of an imagined event in the memory of children over 
repeated interviews.133  An actor, “Mr. Science,” performed science 
experiments for a group of young children.134  After the presentation, the 
children were asked: “Did Mr. Science put something yucky in your 
mouth?”135  The children were later interviewed a second time.  At this second 
interview the children were again asked if Mr. Science had put something 
yucky in their mouth.  For one study, twenty-six percent of the three-year-olds 
and thirty-two percent of the four-year-olds falsely reported that Mr. Science 
had, indeed, “put something yucky in [their] mouth[s],” and even went on to 
describe this event, though the only source for a memory of this event was that 
a previous interviewer had asked the child about “Mr. Science” and the 
“yucky” thing.136  It is believed that this effect is caused by children’s inability 
to distinguish between information that is “familiar because it was mentioned 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; Powell et al., supra note 16, at 1475. 
 131. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2144–45. 
 132. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55–56; see also supra notes 96–101 and accompanying 
text. 
 133. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 54 (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of 
Parental Suggestions, Interviewing Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, 
Presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute (June 1996)). 
 134. Id. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing 
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced 
Study Institute (June 1996)). 
 135. Id. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing 
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced 
Study Institute (June 1996)).  Of course he had not.  Mr. Science merely came and performed 
science experiments for the children.  Id. 
 136. Id. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing 
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced 
Study Institute (June 1996)).  This is an example of a “narrative.”  The child falsely says “yes,” 
then goes on to add credence to his or her claim by saying how it happened.  Mr. Science never 
“put something yucky” in the children’s mouths, yet the children went on so say how he did it, 
what it tasted like, and even posited reasons for why he would do that, among other things. 
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in a prior interview and information that [is] familiar because the event had 
been experienced.”137 
This effect can be made worse by long intervals between interviews.138  
Misinformation that is implanted in this way is also exacerbated as time from 
the event increases because memory of the event decays and blends with the 
information implanted by the interviewer.139  “Even in the typical sexual abuse 
case, it is not uncommon for the alleged child victim to be interviewed several 
times by a variety of agencies;” therefore, it is key to consider the 
suggestiveness of an interview in light of the number of interviews conducted 
before the subject interview.140  Thus, it appears that a “suggestive interview” 
must be viewed from the totality of three general factors: suggestiveness of the 
interview generally, the child’s age, and the number of interviews, all of which 
can be affected by many sources and can have an interrelated effect. 
C. Real World Examples of Suggestibility and Interview Techniques 
Lest one should think that such egregious transgressions and 
misinformation could only occur in the laboratory setting, with researchers 
attempting to confuse children, one should look to some real-world examples.  
Researchers using the continuum of suggestive questions141 have used 
transcripts of actual child sexual abuse interviews to show both the extent of 
suggestive and option-posing questions used with an inherent lack of free 
recall questions and the extent to which interviewers use such questions early 
in the interview (often as the first question), even after being warned of the 
dangers of such questions (false positives and that the legal system will 
exclude the evidence).142  Typically, fifty-three percent of all questions in an 
interview will be suggestive or option-posing, while only five percent will be 
of the free recall variety.143  While these numbers may be astonishing, they are 
 
 137. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 54. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of 
Parental Suggestions, Interviewing Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, 
Presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute (June 1996)). 
 138. Powell et al., supra note 16, at 1474–75. 
 139. Id. at 1475.  Referred to as “trace theory,” this refers to the “traces” of memory that exist 
in one’s memory.  See id at 1473, 1475.  The theory suggests that false details are easier to 
implant as time passes because the traces of memory are stronger when an event is more recent, 
while the traces decay as time passes.  Id at 1475.  For an expansive discussion of “trace theory,” 
as well as the effect of repeated experiences on suggestiveness, see id. at 1463. 
 140. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2145; see also POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55 (noting 
that often children are interviewed between twelve and thirty times during the course of an 
investigation). 
 141. See supra notes 80–95 and accompanying text. 
 142. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1355–56, 1359. 
 143. Id. at 1359 (listing statistics for typical United States interviewers). 
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not as concrete of an example as the interviews conducted in the Michaels 
case. 
“The interrogations undertaken in the course of [the Michaels] case 
utilized most, if not all, of the practices that are disfavored or condemned by 
experts, law enforcement authorities and government agencies.”144  The spark 
of the investigation was a rather ambiguous statement made by a child, while 
having his temperature taken rectally, that that was “what [his] teacher does to 
[him] at naptime at school.”145  Some argue that this could have been a 
misinterpretation of an ambiguous statement as an allegation of abuse, in a 
social climate that was ripe for such a misinterpretation.146  Regardless of 
whether this first incident was a misinterpretation, the court in Michaels and 
the researchers are in agreement that virtually none of the other children 
volunteered any information about the alleged abuse.147  All of the children 
were interviewed by investigators that had no training in the interviewing of 
children.148  These investigators conducted repeated interviews of the children 
using no free recall questions to elicit any abusive information.149  
Investigators routinely became frustrated with the children.150  The children 
were often “asked blatantly leading questions that furnished information the 
children themselves had not mentioned.”151  Investigators combined this with 
social peer pressure, often stating that “other children had told [them] that 
Kelly [Michaels, the defendant,] had done bad things to children.”152 
This created an exponential growth in the number of children making 
allegations also enlarging the magnitude of the allegations.153  At first, more 
children reported “temperature taking,” then being touched with a spoon, then 
 
 144. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994).  For an interesting and in-depth 
review of every facet of the Michaels case from the perspective of an attorney for Kelly Michaels, 
see Robert Rosenthal, State of New Jersey  v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An Overview, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 246 (1995). 
 145. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 19 (internal quotations omitted). 
 146. Id.  For an intriguing discussion of the social environment of the 1980s and why it was 
ripe for such misinterpretations, see id. at 21–31. 
 147. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379; Historical Review, supra note 17, at 403–04; Rosenthal, 
supra note 144, at 252 (“[N]one of the other children made any reports of abuse until after [the 
police] began questioning them.”). 
 148. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379. 
 149. Id.  The “abusive” facts were elicited through other, more suggestive, questions.  Id. at 
1379–80. 
 150. Id.  They often became angry, saying such things as “[t]ell me what happened . . . . I’ll 
make you fall on your butt again.”  Id. at 1387 (alterations in the original). 
 151. Id. at 1380.  As previously discussed, this is the most suggestive question possible, and 
with repeated interviews, it can be particularly harmful. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 251–52. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
518 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:499 
 
a child imparted that a “nude pile-up game” was played.154  Quickly other 
children agreed that such a game occurred and added that Kelly would play 
“Jingle Bells” naked.155  Soon allegations began that Kelly would insert knives, 
spoons, forks, and Lego building blocks into them.156  Next allegations of 
peanut butter and jelly being smeared on children and licked off began, 
followed by instances of children being forced to urinate and defecate on Kelly 
while she would force them to eat feces.157  Each time a new allegation was 
alleged by a child, other children would be specifically asked about the 
activity, often being told that other children had told investigators about the 
event.  Slowly, each child would acquiesce and say that it had occurred.158 
Perhaps the most shocking part of the allegations is that during the seven 
months this abuse was alleged to have occurred, while knives were being 
“inserted into [children’s] rectums, vaginas, and penises . . . [not a] single 
injury was reported on a single child that indicated any of these alleged 
acts.”159  Further, not a single parent reported smelling any odd smells of 
peanut butter or feces on their children or any odd behavior associated with 
abuse.160  No pediatricians seen during the seven months of alleged abuse 
noticed any abusive signs.161  No one at the day care noticed any of these 
strange activities, and FBI laboratory tests showed no signs of “human protein” 
consistent with the “nude pile-up game” or the allegations of urination and 
defecation.162  Despite all of these inconsistencies, parents were told that an 
investigation was ongoing “regarding serious allegations” of abuse, told of 
other children’s tales, and asked to be aware of signs of abuse on their 
children.163 
The last “straw” of the investigation, for the court, seemed to be the 
obvious lack of impartiality by the police.  One interviewer stated that it was 
“his professional and ethical responsibility to alleviate whatever anxiety [the 
children had] as a result of what happened to [the children].”164  Guided by 
their zeal and personal beliefs that abuse occurred, the interviewers did not 
challenge the outlandish tales of abuse and proceeded to vilify Kelly in the 
 
 154. Id. at 252. 
 155. Id.  Each time a new “fact” was uncovered, the investigators would begin asking the 
other children if it happened.  Id.  Usually, after some time, the children would say that it 
happened and add to the tales.  Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379–80; Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 251–52. 
 159. Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 252. 
 160. Id. at 253. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 253–54 
 163. Historical Review, supra note 17, at 404. 
 164. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 
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interviews.165  Investigators repeatedly told the children that Kelly was “bad” 
and had done “bad things”; not surprisingly the children eventually “took the 
bait” and reported the “bad things” she had done.166  “In sum, the record 
contains numerous instances of egregious violations of proper interview 
protocols.”167  Despite these facts, Kelly was convicted on one hundred and 
fifteen counts of various abuse and sentenced to forty-seven years of 
imprisonment.168 
Kelly was eventually released, due to these “egregious violations,” after 
five years of imprisonment; however, it should be clear that something went 
wrong in this case.  Perhaps Kelly was a child abuser.  If so, she should be 
finishing her forty-seven-year term.  More likely, she was an innocent day-care 
teacher.  If so, she should not have spent five years in jail, as well as all the 
years of investigation and her trial.169  Some suggestions to address the 
problems of the Michaels case should be examined. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF SUGGESTIVE 
INTERVIEWS 
Section A of Part IV explains some of the methods, proposed by 
psychological scholars, to reduce the problem of suggestive interviews.  
Section B analyzes the solution proposed by the New Jersey Supreme Court to 
address the problem of suggestive interviews of children. 
A. Psychological Scholars Propose Methods to Improve Interviews 
Most researchers note the reality that suggestive hearsay will not be 
admissible at trial,170 and they are also concerned with possible false 
positives.171  Therefore, many researchers pose possible solutions for how to 
minimize the problems that occurred in the Michaels case.  The major 
suggestions consist of training, formulating a uniform investigative protocol, 
and recording interviews.  Most researchers realize that “only improvement in 
the average quality of investigative interviews are [sic] likely to bring about 
improvements in our ability to protect children.”172  To this end, numerous 
 
 165. Id. at 1379–80. 
 166. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 64.  One child acquiesced and agreed that Kelly had 
done “bad things,” but when pressed further, stated she did not know what the “bad things” were 
because “[Kelly] only did them to [another child].”  Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1385. 
 167. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380. 
 168. Id. at 1375. 
 169. The investigation began in early 1985, and Kelly was convicted on April 15, 1988.  
Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 248–49, 262. 
 170. See, e.g., Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360. 
 171. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 45. 
 172. Lamb & Sternberg, supra note 44, at 821. 
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training guides have been developed to educate and aid interviewers.173  
Greatly simplified, the advice is to: (a) use free recall questions as much as 
possible and, if option-posing and suggestive questions are necessary, to use 
them at the end of interviews so that the transcripts of earlier portions of the 
interview might be admissible; (b) try option-posing questions before 
suggestive questions; and (c) try to quickly revert to free recall questions if 
option-posing or suggestive questions are necessary.174 
However, despite training efforts, interviewers will often revert to 
suggestive techniques of interviewing.175  To alleviate this, two suggestions are 
often made.  First is the creation of a universal investigative protocol to guide 
interviews while interviewing children.176  The protocol would function as a 
“cheat sheet” of questions to ask children and to help interviewers maintain a 
free recall interview for as long as possible.177  Second, many have suggested 
mandatory recording of interviews.178  Recording such interviews has many 
benefits, including a fresh account from the child, the fact that the tape can be 
shared among agencies, reducing the need for repeated interviews, and the 
existence of an easy way to check the interview for suggestiveness.179  
“Undoubtedly, the research on suggestibility has done a lot of good”180 with 
regard to training; however, there has yet to be developed an ideal 
“nonsuggestive interview,” and taking into consideration the many factors of 
development, interviewer question form, timing and number of interviews, and 
necessity, it is unlikely that one will ever develop.  Therefore, the question 
remains how courts should address the issue when a defendant claims that an 
alleged child victim has been suggestively interviewed, to the point of creating 
a false positive.  The answer provided by the New Jersey Supreme Court was 
to conduct a pretrial taint hearing.181 
B. New Jersey Supreme Court Proposes Monitoring Interviews with Taint 
Hearings 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of whether or not a 
particular interview (or battery of interviews) of a child (or children) was 
 
 173. E.g., POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1; DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13; 
INTERVIEWING IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 40. 
 174. Lamb & Sternberg, supra note 44, at 820–21. 
 175. Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1631–33. 
 176. Id. at 1632–33. 
 177. Id. at 1633. 
 178. Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The 
Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927, 941 (1993). 
 179. Id. at 941–42. 
 180. Lyon, supra note 33, at 126. 
 181. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382–83 (N.J. 1994). 
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suggestive in Michaels, holding that a pretrial taint hearing should be 
conducted wherein the trial court can make a ruling on the suggestiveness of 
the interview and thereby decide if the transcript of the interview (and other 
evidence of the interview) should be excluded from trial and even if the child 
should be excluded from testifying at trial.182  This Section first looks at the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning and then turns to the 
procedure mandated for these taint hearings. 
1. The Reasoning of State v. Michaels 
Kelly Michaels argued that “the interview techniques used by the state in 
[her] case were so coercive or suggestive that they had a capacity to distort 
substantially the children’s recollections of actual events and thus compromise 
the reliability of the children’s statements and testimony based on their 
recollections.”183  Kelly argued that the interviews were so poorly conducted 
that the reliability of the statements made during the interviews, as well as any 
future testimony of the child might give, was patently unreliable.184  The basic 
premise is that the suggestive interviews made the transcripts unreliable and 
any future testimony the children might give would be riddled with the same 
“impurities” from the interviewers that exist in the transcripts.185  The court 
began by noting that its precedent was clear: “children, as a class, are not to be 
viewed as inherently suspect witnesses.”186  The court, however, recognized 
the dangers inherent in improper interviews of children because “our common 
experience tells us that children generate special concerns because of their 
vulnerability, immaturity, and impressionability, and our laws have recognized 
and attempted to accommodate those concerns, particularly in the area of child 
sexual abuse.”187  From this concern, the court also stated that the impact of 
improper interviewing has a greater effect on children.188  The Michaels court 
avoided the issue of “whether children as a class are more or less susceptible to 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1377. 
 184. Id. at 1375.  This phenomenon, often referred to as “false memory syndrome,” states that 
once a researcher or interviewer has suggestively implanted the idea of an encounter in a subject’s 
or patient’s mind, that person will believe that it occurred and speak of it as if it actually occurred 
thereafter.  DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY 250–52 (1996).  For an exhaustive 
series of essays on the fragile and not-so-fragile aspects of the human mind, see id. 
 185. As discussed, supra pp. 511-12, an interviewer’s suggestive language can become part of 
the child’s memory.  If the child’s in-court testimony is thought of as simply a repeated interview, 
the danger is obvious: Just as the later interviews will contain the misinformation, the child’s 
testimony in court will contain the same misinformation. 
 186. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376; Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 269. 
 187. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376. 
 188. Id. at 1378. 
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suggestion than adults”189 by focusing on the interview techniques used by the 
state in its investigation. 
The court’s analysis began by favorably citing research that found that 
coercive and suggestive interviews can shape a child’s responses and that “[i]f 
a child’s recollection of events has been molded by an interrogation, that 
influence undermines the reliability of the child’s responses as an accurate 
recollection of actual events.”190  The court noted the factors that can weigh on 
suggestiveness.191  The New Jersey Supreme Court is not alone in recognizing 
that improper interrogations can have a negative effect on children’s 
testimony; “[o]ther courts have recognized that once tainted the distortion of 
[a] child’s mind is irremediable.”192  The court felt that the fact that the 
research is virtually unanimous in its view of dangers of improper interview 
techniques and that so much effort is put into training of interviewers and into 
the productions of protocols for interviewing helped to bolster the conclusion 
that improper techniques for interviewing lead to inadmissible testimony.193 
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court looked to United States Supreme 
Court precedent that is in accord with the belief that improper interrogations of 
children lead to inadmissible testimony.194  The case of Idaho v. Wright,195 
addressed the admissibility of a child’s hearsay in light of the suggestive 
technique used to elicit this hearsay.196  Unlike Michaels, Wright dealt with the 
exclusion of the hearsay testimony of the child only.197  The court found that 
the hearsay statements of the child should be excluded under the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause doctrine.198  The Confrontation Clause, 
 
 189. Id. at 1376–77. 
 190. Id. at 1377. 
 191. Id.  The court reviewed the research and noted that lack of interviewer neutrality, leading 
questions, a lack of control over peer pressure, the use of repeated questions, the vilification of 
the suspect, the interviewer’s tone of voice, and promised rewards, among other factors, could 
undermine an interview.  Id. 
 192. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377–78 (citing State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Idaho 
1989) (“Once this tainting of memory has occurred, the problem is irredeemable.  That memory 
is, from then on, as real to the child as any other.”). 
 193. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1378. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 196. Id. at 814–17. 
 197. Id. at 814–16.  In this case all parties and the court agreed that the young hearsay 
declarant was not capable of communicating with the jury.  Id. at 809.  For this reason, the Court 
did not need to address the question of the child testifying in court after the suggestive interview 
techniques had been used on the child. 
 198. Id. at 826–27.  The defendant in Wright had challenged the witness’s testimony under 
the Sixth Amendment preference for a “face-to-face” confrontation with the witness.  Id. at 812–
14.  The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when (1) the witness is shown to 
be unavailable, a fact stipulated by both parties, id. at 809, and (2) the statement bears sufficient 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS 523 
 
basically, protects the right of a criminal defendant to confront and cross-
examine those who testify against the defendant.  Hearsay is implicated in the 
Confrontation Clause because a criminal defendant does not have the chance to 
confront the declarant of a hearsay statement in court. 
The United States Supreme Court first found that “Idaho’s residual hearsay 
exception . . . under which the challenged statements were admitted . . . is not a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes[;]” 
therefore, the statements would need to show “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness” to be admitted.199  The Court then went on to find that 
because of the presumptive unreliability of out-of-court statements and the 
suggestive questions used to generate the hearsay, there was no reason to find 
the statements “particularly trustworthy.”200  The Court based this decision to 
exclude, in part, on the suggestive interview techniques used by the 
interviewer.201  The New Jersey Supreme Court found that United States 
Supreme Court precedent was in accord that improper interrogations of the 
type that occurred in Michaels indicate the “potential for the elicitation of 
unreliable information.”202  The New Jersey Supreme Court summarized by 
stating that a “sufficient consensus exists . . . to warrant the conclusion that the 
use of coercive or highly suggestive interrogation techniques can create a 
significant risk that the interrogation itself will distort the child’s recollection 
of events, thereby undermining the reliability of the statements and subsequent 
testimony concerning such events.”203 
The Michaels Court then examined the facts of this particular case204 and 
agreed with the appellate court that the interviews appeared “highly 
improper.”205  The court then took the “somewhat extraordinary step”206 of 
mandating that a pretrial taint hearing be conducted to determine if the 
“pretrial statements and in-court testimony based on that recollection are 
unreliable and should not be admitted into evidence” if the state sought to 
prosecute its case against Kelly Michaels.207  However, to bolster the 
credibility of this decision, the court drew analogies to existing pretrial 
 
indicia of reliability.  Id. at 814–15.  This “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception[;]” for other cases, a showing 
of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” is required.  Id. at 815 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980)). 
 199. Id. at 815–17. 
 200. Wright, 497 U.S. at 826. 
 201. Id. 
 202. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1378 (N.J. 1994) (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13). 
 203. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). 
 204. See supra pp. 516-19. 
 205. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380. 
 206. Id. at 1381. 
 207. Id. at 1380. 
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eyewitness identification and hypnotically-recalled testimony.208  Courts have 
authorized pretrial hearings on the admissibility of pretrial identification 
testimony believed to be tainted by suggestiveness.209  A court, therefore, 
should examine all of the circumstances when determining whether the 
procedure used to obtain a pretrial identification was suggestive enough to 
cause an irreparable mistaken identification.210  At such a hearing, “[i]f the 
court finds the pre-trial identification procedure unduly suggestive, giving rise 
to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, the testimony is inadmissible at 
trial.”211 
Hypnotically recalled testimony presents a suggestiveness problem similar 
to child interviews and prior New Jersey precedent authorized a similar taint 
hearing.212  A person under hypnosis is vulnerable to suggestion; therefore, a 
court should conduct a hearing to gauge if unduly suggestive properties 
inhered during a particular hypnotic episode before hypnotically enhanced 
testimony can be admitted at trial.213  In both of these examples, the court saw 
“extraordinary situations” where police misconduct possibly compromised the 
judicial system and stated that the court would not back down from assuring 
the integrity of the judicial system.214 
The Michaels Court therefore found support for its decision to require a 
taint hearing in United States Supreme Court precedent concerning pretrial 
hearings on identification procedures.215  The situations involved are virtually 
identical.  Pretrial identifications and pretrial investigative interviews of child 
sexual abuse victims are both “critical moment[s] in the course of a criminal 
 
 208. Id. at 1381; Jablonski, supra note 29, at 53–55.  Hypnotically recalled testimony 
involves the use of hypnosis, usually performed by a trained psychologist, to enhance a person’s 
recollection.  See id. at 52–55.  The entire procedure is often referred to as a “hypnotic episode” 
and can make the “individual under hypnosis . . . extremely vulnerable to suggestion, lose[] 
critical judgment, [or possibly] confuse memories evoked under hypnosis with those recalled 
prior to the hypnotic state.”  Id. at 55.  Many states have substantial legislative and judicial 
safeguards in place to govern the admissibility of such hypnotically induced testimony.  Andrew 
J. Hickey, Evidence—Rhode Island Courts Require Preliminary Hearing When Determining 
Admissibility of Expert Proffered Repressed Memory Testimony State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 
879 (R.I. 1996), 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 771, 772–74 (1996). 
 209. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) 
(authorizing hearing to determine admissibility of in court identification testimony because of 
pretrial suggestiveness)). 
 210. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 54 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381 (citing State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1980)); see also 
Jablonski, supra note 29, at 54–55 (citing State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 97–98 (N.J. 1981)). 
 213. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 55. 
 214. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381. 
 215. Id. at 1382 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). 
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prosecution.”216  In both instances, a case can be dismissed if damaging 
information regarding a suspect is not acquired; however, both are “riddled 
with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even 
crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”217  Additionally, both types of testimony 
are virtually impossible to overcome, particularly because in both situations the 
witness is “absolutely convinced of the accuracy of [his or her false] 
recollection.”218  Because of this conviction, the credibility219 of the witness 
will be virtually impeccable, despite the falsehood of the person’s statements.  
Credibility, in this context, is the witness’s “truth-telling demeanor,” typically 
decided by a jury.220  After determining that a taint hearing would be in order, 
the Michaels Court turned to the mechanics of such a hearing. 
2. Procedure for Taint Hearings Outlined by State v. Michaels 
The basic issue to be decided at the taint hearing is “whether the pretrial 
events . . . were so suggestive that they give rise to a substantial likelihood of 
irreparably mistaken or false recollection of material facts bearing on the 
defendant’s guilt.”221  The court addressed the issue of whether the interview 
technique was so improper as to distort the children’s recollections and 
compromise the out-of-court and in-court statements of the children by 
adopting a two-step, burden-shifting structure.222  The initial burden is on the 
defendant to produce “some evidence” that the child’s statements were the 
product of improper interviewing223 to trigger a pretrial hearing.224  The court 
noted, without limiting the grounds that may trigger a taint hearing, that: 
[T]he kind of practices used here—the absence of spontaneous recall, 
interviewer bias, repeated leading questions, multiple interviews, incessant 
questioning, vilification of defendant, ongoing contact with peers and 
references to their statements, and the use of threats, bribes and cajoling, as 
well as the failure to videotape or otherwise document the initial interview 
sessions—constitute more than sufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
 
 216. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967)). 
 217. Id. (quoting Wade, 388 U.S at 230).  The parallels between a pretrial identification, 
where a victim or witness actually points a finger at the suspect and a child sexual abuse 
interview, where the child points out the abuser, are obvious. 
 218. Id. Eyewitness identifications and a child saying that the suspect abused him or her are 
powerful types of evidence.  This power is generally made more convincing if the witness or 
child is convinced that the identification is correct and believes it. 
 219. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1382–83. 
 222. Id. at 1377–85. 
 223. Id. at 1383.  This keeps with the idea that children are presumed to be no less reliable 
than other witnesses.  Id. 
 224. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383. 
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interrogations created a substantial risk that the statements and anticipated 
testimony are unreliable, and therefore justify a taint hearing.225 
The burden would then shift to the proponent of the evidence to prove the 
reliability of the testimony by “clear and convincing evidence.”226 
The court then went on to state that both the state and the defendant are 
permitted to offer expert testimony regarding the practices used in the 
interviews.227  The court further cautioned that the testimony should be limited 
to an attack on (or the support of) the interview techniques, not the credibility 
of the child.228  Further, the court held that the state can demonstrate that the 
child’s statements are reliable by offering independent indicia of reliability that 
supports the child’s statements.229  This element keeps the focus on the totality 
of the circumstances, which must be examined to decide whether events have 
“irremediably distorted” the child’s testimony and memory.230  Finally, the 
court held that if any portions of a child’s testimony are found by the judge to 
be sufficiently reliable for admission at trial, then it is for the jury to decide the 
probative value of the evidence, and, to that end, experts may again be called 
to testify as to the methods of interviewing used in the investigation.231  New 
York, which has adopted the Michaels taint hearing, also follows these same 
procedures for conducting the hearings.232 
While there has not been a rush to adopt the procedure of taint hearings 
advocated in Michaels, at least one state has adopted this process, and it has 
been suggested that a trend will develop in that direction.233  Therefore, 
although there are certainly jurisdictions that do not employ taint hearings,234 
the question for the jurisdictions that currently employ them becomes how 
 
 225. Id.  Virtually all of the sorts of techniques which were discussed in this Comment as 
being too suggestive. 
 226. Id.  This standard was chosen to serve “to safeguard the fairness of a defendant’s trial 
without making legitimate prosecution of child sexual abuse impossible.”  Id. at 1384.  The court 
based this decision largely on its conclusion that the improper interviews were based largely on 
over-zealousness and ineptitude rather than bad faith.  Id. 
 227. Id. at 1383. 
 228. Id.  While this may seem counter-intuitive, an attack on the techniques is not a direct 
attack on the credibility of the child.  Children are generally no less credible than adults; it is only 
after suggestive techniques are used on kids that their testimony becomes suspect.  Therefore, the 
taint hearings are merely to judge the suggestiveness of the interview.  See supra pp. 513-20. 
 229. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383. 
 230. Id. at 1383–84. 
 231. Id. at 1384.  Again, the experts are not allowed to testify to the jury directly about the 
credibility of a child witness. 
 232. See, e.g., People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
 233. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 58. 
 234. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text. 
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these hearings should be conducted.  More specifically, this paper addresses 
the issue of who should adjudicate the taint hearing. 
V.  TAINT HEARINGS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BY AN ADJUDICATOR TRAINED 
IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Whether or not an interview has been conducted in an unduly suggestive 
manner is a complex issue that takes into consideration a myriad of 
psychological issues that are beyond the ken of most people.235  If an interview 
is found to be suggestive, it will not be admitted into evidence, and quite 
possibly the testimony of the child interviewed will be excluded at trial as 
well.236  However, if an interview is found to be non-suggestive, it will be 
admitted at trial and the testimony of the child will be a virtually 
insurmountable item of evidence for a defendant, as well it should be for cases 
in which abuse has occurred.237  Thus, the decision of whether an interview 
was suggestive is quite an exceptional circumstance.  A pretrial taint hearing, 
therefore, is a “critical moment”238 in the litigation, wherein a judge must make 
an informed decision about whether the lynchpin of a child sexual abuse 
prosecution will be admitted.239  The judge must often decide between the 
testimony of two competing experts, chosen by each side for his or her 
particular stance on the suggestiveness of the interview involved.240  A judge 
deciding such an issue should have some training in the social sciences, 
statistics, and experimental methods and ideally some training in the 
interviewing of child witnesses.  Most judges simply do not have this 
training.241  When a defendant has made a showing of “some evidence”242 of 
improper interviews and a trial judge orders a taint hearing, the judge should 
 
 235. See supra pp. 513-20. 
 236. See Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382–83. 
 237. Id. at 1382 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)).  Although a case 
where the child’s testimony is excluded may still be successful because physical evidence may 
still be used to convict the defendant, a child’s testimony that is admitted may be impossible for 
the defendant to overcome.  This is a burden that a defendant should not have to overcome if the 
interview was suggestive. 
 238. Id. (citing Wade, 388 U.S at 230). 
 239. If the child’s testimony and the transcript from the child’s interview are both excluded 
from evidence it is usually the death knell for a case, whereas getting the evidence admitted could 
be equally destructive to a defendant’s case. 
 240. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383; Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that often an 
expert is selected based solely for his beliefs and that this can be dangerous for child sexual abuse 
cases); Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valuations: A Forum-
Specific Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1247 (1994). 
 241. See supra note 41. 
 242. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383. 
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also appoint a technically trained adjudicator,243 trained in the above-
mentioned sciences, to conduct the hearing.  Before 2004, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure referred to such adjudicators as “special masters,” and this 
paper will do the same.244 
When a case involves technical, scientific issues, the appointment of 
special masters has been forthcoming.245  Special masters have been appointed 
for environmental issues,246 taxation issues,247 accounting issues,248 and many 
other issues.249  The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) 
provides a good framework for the special master proposed herein: It provides 
for the mandatory appointment of a special master for complicated vaccine 
injury cases and provides for deferential review of the special master’s 
findings.250  The case of Terran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services251 
presents a great example of the use of a special master.  In Terran, a young 
girl, Julie Terran (Julie), began having seizures shortly after her third 
diphtheria-pertusis-tetanus (DPT) vaccination.252  Causation issues developed 
because Julie was also mentally retarded and shortly after birth had surgery to 
remove a meningocele lump from her skull.253  When suit was filed against the 
pediatrician who administered the DPT vaccination, the case was referred to a 
special master pursuant to the NCVIA.254 
 
 243. “Special master” is the language used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 for such 
adjudicators.  FED. R. CIV. P. 53.  The suggestion for a specially trained judge stems from this 
rule, which refers to a person technically trained to sit as judge for specific issues.  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 53. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Goins v. Hitchcock I.S.D, 191 F. Supp.2d 860, 866–67 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (discrimination 
issue); Heatley v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 6:01CV-1044-ORL22DAB, 2002 WL 
31934322, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2002) (taxation issue). 
 246. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1042 (2d Cir. 1983); 
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).  In re “Agent Orange” 
Product Liability Litigation is a particularly good example of a court’s reliance on special masters 
to help with litigation.  The court used at least eight different special masters for various parts of 
the trial from discovery to appeal.  Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A 
Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 486 (1993). 
 247. Heatley, 2002 WL 31934322, at *6. 
 248. Goins, 191 F. Supp.2d at 866–67. 
 249. Di Lello, supra note 246, at 486; see also D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, What are 
“Exceptional Conditions” Justifying Reference Under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1 A.L.R. 
FED. 922 (1969). 
 250. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §300aa–12(e)(2)(B) (2000); see generally Elizabeth 
A. Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 309 (1999). 
 251. 195 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 252. Id. at 1306. 
 253. Id. 
 254. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (2000); Terran, 195 F.3d at 1307. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS 529 
 
The special master in Terran addressed complicated factual issues and 
conducted a “Daubert hearing”255 on the plaintiff’s proposed scientific theory 
of causation.256  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., provides a 
framework of factors for deciding when expert testimony or scientific evidence 
should be admitted at trial.257  The court in Terran found that the special 
master had appropriately used the Daubert test to decide the admissibility of 
the plaintiff’s theory of recovery.258  “The special master found that the 
Daubert inquiry raised serious questions about the testimony, and thus 
concluded that the proffered theory of causation was not sufficiently 
reliable.”259  Further, the special master made factual findings regarding the 
temporal order of the vaccine and Julie’s other medical conditions and rejected 
the plaintiff’s arguments that Julie exhibited a “unique seizure disorder.”260  
Taking all these factors into consideration, the special master denied 
recovery.261  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit then 
held that without a finding that the special master’s findings of law and fact 
were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law,” it was compelled to affirm the special master’s 
findings.262 
A procedure similar to the one outlined by the NCVIA and utilized in 
Terran would help ensure the fair adjudication of child sexual abuse cases, 
when the suggestiveness of the child’s interview is in question.  Section A 
consists of a look at the sources of legal authority for courts to appoint special 
masters.  Section B concludes that the appointment of a special master to 
adjudicate a pretrial taint hearing will not run afoul of any constitutional 
provisions.  Section C provides that the appointment of a special master to 
adjudicate a taint hearing will not cause undue delay or expense.  Court-
appointed experts are examined and analyzed as an inferior solution to the 
appointment of a special master in Section D.  Finally, a procedure for the 
appointment of a special master to adjudicate taint hearings is proposed in 
Section E. 
 
 255. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 256. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1316. 
 257. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95.  The factors include: (1) whether a theory or technique can 
be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; 
(3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards for 
controlling the error; and, (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a 
relevant scientific community.  Id. 
 258. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1316. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 1317. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(e)(2)(B) (1994)). 
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A. Courts Possess Ample Legal Authority to Appoint Special Masters 
Judges can turn to at least four sources for the legal authority to appoint a 
technically trained adjudicator to help decide issues.263  First, the authority to 
appoint highly-trained individuals already exists in the rules of civil procedure 
for most jurisdictions, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.264  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 allows judges to appoint a special master 
by the consent of the parties, if a difficult accounting or computation of 
damages is necessary, if a matter will be particularly time-consuming, or for 
“some exceptional condition.”265  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 was 
amended, effective December 1, 2003; however, it retains the “exceptional 
condition” language.266  Special masters, under the amended rule, have 
authority to decide factual issues and make special reports to the presiding trial 
judge.267  While the amended rule altered the standard of review, requiring trial 
courts to review the special master’s findings de novo,268 it remains to be seen 
what deference the court will give such findings, in light of the more 
deferential standard of review originally applied.  Special masters have been 
appointed to many types of issues pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
53.269  Most, if not all state jurisdictions have a counterpart to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 53, allowing judges to appoint special masters for similar 
situations.270  Clearly then, courts realize that there are often matters that are 
simply beyond the scope of judges. 
Courts also have the power to appoint a special master if the parties 
consent to such an appointment.271  Most commentators and courts agree that 
appointment of a special master under this power is subject to less formal 
constraints than under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.272  The third source 
 
 263. Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 
EMORY L.J. 927, 943–44 (1994). 
 264. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.490 (West 2004). 
 265. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (2004). 
 266. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(i) (2003) (amended 2003), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
53(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004). 
 267. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (2004); Di Lello, supra note 246, at 486–87; 28 FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 64:57 ( 2004). 
 268. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(4).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, as originally written, 
provided for a special master’s decisions to be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard.  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 53 advisory committee’s note. 
 269. Di Lello, supra note 246, at 486; 28 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 64:57; 
see generally Ytreberg, supra note 249. 
 270. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.490 (West 2004). 
 271. Farrell, supra note 263, at 943. 
 272. Id. at 943 n.54.  Obviously, such appointments cannot contravene legislation or public 
policy concerns. 
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of power to appoint a special master is from specific legislative acts.273  For 
example, the Magistrates Act provides that magistrate judges may be appointed 
as special masters,274 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for appointment 
of a special master if the case cannot be set for trial within 120 days.275  The 
appointment of special masters is even mandatory under some federal statutes, 
such as the NCVIA.276  For matters involving injuries to children believed to 
be caused by vaccines, a special master, with medical knowledge, is to be 
appointed to determine whether there is a substantive claim of causation of the 
injury against the vaccine manufacturer.277  Finally, courts have the “inherent 
power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the 
performance of their duties. . . .” including the “authority to appoint persons 
unconnected with the court . . . . with or without the consent of the parties,” to 
simplify and clarify issues and to make tentative findings.278 
Special masters are often lawyers, possessing special knowledge in the 
field; however, they need not be members of the bar.279  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 53 does not require that the special master be a member of the 
bar,280 nor do the state rules which allow the appointment of a special 
master.281  Special masters are held to the same standards of professional 
conduct a judge would be; however, anyone can be appointed to be a special 
master if the court deems it appropriate.282  A special master appointed for a 
taint hearing should follow this custom.  While it would be nice to appoint a 
special master who is trained in the law, the most important factor for fairly 
deciding the issues of admissibility in a taint hearing is psychology training.  
The special master should first and foremost be trained in psychology, then, if 
possible, trained in the law.  Obviously, some legal training should be afforded 
such adjudicators so that the hearing can comport with the law.  A legal degree 
is not necessary, though.  Appointment of a special master who is not legally 
trained is not uncommon, nor is legal training necessary because of the limited 
 
 273. Id. at 943. 
 274. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (2000). 
 275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (2000). 
 276. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c) (2000); Breen, supra note 250, at 318. 
 277. Breen, supra note 250, at 317–18. 
 278. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920). 
 279. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003) with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004); see 
also JEAN  M. NAFFKY, 45 FLA. JUR. 2D References § 6 (2004). 
 280. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003) with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004). 
 281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.490 (West 2004); see also NAFFKY, supra note 279, at § 6. 
 282. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003), with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004); see 
also NAFFKY, supra note 279, at § 6.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, a special master 
is required to follow the same rules of conduct that a judge is required to follow, including 
remaining neutral, not having a relationship with a party, and not maintaining any ex parte 
contact with a party, among other requirements.  FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(2) (2004). 
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evidentiary focus of the pretrial taint hearing and because the more stringent 
rules of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in these pretrial 
situations.283 
Appointment of a special master in child-interview circumstances would 
be appropriate to address the problem of competing experts chosen solely for 
their favorable stance to one side or the other.284  A special master with 
training in this area would be able to make better sense of the evidence and be 
less persuaded by a “hired gun” expert.285  With this in mind, the next issue is 
whether or not the appointment of a special master in a criminal, pretrial taint 
hearing, would run afoul of the Constitution. 
B. Appointment of Special Masters to Adjudicate Taint Hearings Does Not 
Violate the Constitution 
Special masters are appointed to “remedy a decisionmaker’s insufficient 
technical background.”286  The fact that the proceeding is criminal, rather than 
civil, does not make an adjudicator’s lack of technical expertise irrelevant.  In 
fact, because the structure of the criminal trial is such that it reflects a concern 
for protecting the rights of the criminal defendant, a well-trained adjudicator is 
even more necessary in criminal proceedings.287  A taint hearing is a 
preliminary hearing on issues of admissibility of evidence at trial: A matter 
within the province of judges, as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a).288  Particularly for admissibility matters, such as the testimony of a 
child, which would greatly influence a juror’s decision regardless of the 
suggestiveness of the interview, a judge should decide the matter of 
admissibility.289  Because it would be virtually impossible for a jury to 
 
 283. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that for such pretrial evidentiary hearings the rules of 
evidence do not apply).  Thus, the special master need not be specifically trained in the many 
rules of evidence in order to correctly conduct such a hearing. 
 284. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19; Smith, supra note 240, at 1247. 
 285. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19; Smith, supra note 240, at 1247. 
 286. Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1583, 1593 (1995). 
 287. William P. Haney, III, Scientific Evidence in the Age of Daubert: A Proposal for a Dual 
Standard of Admissibility in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1391, 1431 (1994); see 
also supra pp. 510-13 (discussing the use of special masters in criminal proceedings). 
 288. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the 
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, 
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by 
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
Id. 
 289. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE 235 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the role of the judge in 
admissibility decisions). 
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disregard the testimony of a child, even if they found that the techniques were 
too suggestive, the judge should decide such issues of admissibility and screen 
out suggestive interviews. 
Judges have wide latitude in the admissibility of evidence,290 and it is well 
established that such questions of law are within the purview of judges,291 so 
one cannot argue that such an appointment of a special master would run afoul 
of a defendant’s right to a trial by jury.292  A preliminary evidentiary hearing, 
conducted by a judge, is required by justice for admissibility questions 
concerning such issues as hypnotically induced testimony293 and pretrial 
identifications.294  It is also required when a child may have been interviewed 
suggestively.295 
The power to appoint special masters is limited by Article III of the United 
States Constitution, which provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court.”296  The Constitution prevents 
the “reference of a fundamental issue of liability to an adjudicator who does 
not possess the attributes [of an] Article III [judge].”297  A taint hearing does 
not decide the ultimate issue of liability, only admissibility of evidence; 
therefore, a delegation of power to a special master does not violate Article 
III.298  In fact, to allow an adjudicator not trained in technical matters to decide 
such technical issues could arguably violate substantive fairness concerns.299  
Furthermore, Article III judges retain the power to select and appoint such 
special masters; thus, the judge continues to retain ultimate control over the 
 
 290. Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal 
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 758 (1993). 
 291. Id. at 747.  See also ALLEN, supra note 289, at 235–45; Merle Faye Hoffman, Comment, 
The Murky Waters Get Murkier—Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Misconduct in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App 1991), 34 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 181, 184–85 (1993) (discussing the factors a judge should weigh in determining the 
admissibility of evidence). 
 292. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed . . . .”).  Additionally, this is certainly the type of evidence a criminal 
defendant would want excluded from a jury if the interview was conducted suggestively. 
 293. Hickey, supra note 208, at 773–74; see also supra pp. 523-24. 
 294. See supra pp. 523-24. 
 295. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994); see also supra pp. 519-24 
(discussing pretrial taint hearings). 
 296. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
 297. Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing In re Kimberly v. Arm, 
129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889)). 
 298. Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters: Administrative 
Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235, 296–97 (1997) [hereinafter Widener 
Symposium]. 
 299. Id. at 297. 
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proceedings.300  Finally, as early as 1932 in Crowell v. Benson, the United 
States Supreme Court acknowledged the power of judges, in some cases, to 
appoint special masters to assist the court.301  While the Court noted such 
special masters were usually advisory in nature, it also acknowledged that “it 
has not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based 
upon evidence . . . and the parties have no right to demand that the court shall 
redetermine the facts thus found.”302 
Therefore, a deferential use of special masters in taint hearings does not 
present any constitutional problems.  The only argument against special 
masters that remains is the possibility of undue cost and delay. 
C. Special Masters Will Not Cause Undue Delay or Increase Costs 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 warns courts to consider the additional 
expense and delay that may attend the appointment of a special master; 
however, some argue that the appointment of a special master in virtually any 
case actually decreases the cost and certainly decreases the time necessary to 
complete a trial.303  Efficiency and cost-saving arguments are based on the 
speed with which a knowledgeable special master would be able to absorb and 
interpret the expert’s testimony.304  Thus, there would be a cost-saving benefit 
from shorter trials and less billing time for experts and attorneys, as well as a 
reduction in court costs and the many other expenses associated with a trial.305 
Added delay and expense probably stems from the addition of the pretrial 
taint hearing itself.306  Taint hearings are necessary to prevent a misapplication 
of justice when an interview was conducted suggestively.307  The additional 
delay and expense of a taint hearing cannot outweigh the egregiousness of 
admitting such damning evidence, if the evidence is tainted.  The last issue to 
be addressed is why the appointment of a special master is preferential to the 
use of a court-appointed expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. 
D. Appointment of a Special Master is a Better Solution than Appointment of 
a Court-Appointed Expert 
 
 300. Id. at 296. 
 301. 285 U.S. 22, 51–52 (1932). 
 302. Id.  The Benson court was referring to equity and admiralty cases.  Id. at 51.  However, 
this shows that deferential use of special masters is no new idea in American jurisprudence. 
 303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(3); Di Lello, supra note 246, at 473 (arguing that such special 
masters would “bring about better, faster, more efficient and less expensive adjudication of 
factual issues involving technical evidence.”); Widener Symposium, supra note 298, at 296–97. 
 304. See Di Lello, supra note 246, at 473; Widener Symposium, supra note 298, at 296–97. 
 305. See Di Lello, supra note 246, at 473; Widener Symposium, supra note 298, at 296–97. 
 306. This is in contrast to simply admitting or excluding the evidence without the hearing. 
 307. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377–78 (N.J. 1994). 
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Federal Rule of Evidence 706 provides that the court may appoint its own 
experts.308  The Rule does not limit the parties’ abilities to call their own 
experts; it merely provides the authority for judges to appoint an impartial 
expert to assist the court.309  The expert can be used to educate the judge on 
fundamental concepts, to assess the methods used by other experts, to find 
facts in complex scientific cases, to limit massive discovery requests, or to 
assess claims, as well as any other areas with which a technically untrained 
judge might need assistance.310  Special masters and court-appointed experts 
are often used for similar purposes and their roles often overlap;311 however, 
for the purposes of taint hearings, the appointment of a special master is just a 
better option. 
A special master should be appointed to solve the problem of an untrained 
adjudicator deciding difficult technical issues presented by two opposing 
experts.  Appointment of a court-appointed expert does not solve this problem; 
it merely adds another chef to stir the soup of suggestibility.  The ultimate 
issue of an untrained judge deciding the admissibility of a child’s testimony is 
not avoided.  Despite the presence of the court-appointed expert, a judge could 
still be led astray by a “hired gun” expert, chosen solely for his or her stance on 
the issue.312  Appointing an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to 
educate the judge on fundamental concepts of the technical issues leads to at 
least two more problems: undue delay and incomplete knowledge.  
Appointment of a court-appointed expert will lead to undue delay during a 
taint hearing because the expert will need to take the time to educate a judge on 
the issues, while a special master could simply decide the issues based on the 
technical knowledge already possessed by the special master.  Also, education 
of the judge necessarily will involve incomplete training and knowledge 
because the expert can only teach some of his or her knowledge of psychology 
and statistics to the judge.313  A special master, on the other hand, requires no 
 
 308. FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show 
cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to 
submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the 
parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. 
Id. 
 309. FED. R. EVID. 706(a); Samuel H. Jackson, Comment, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal 
Billing with Court Appointed Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal 
Judicial Center Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 (1998). 
 310. FED. R. EVID. 706(a); Jackson, supra note 309, at 443–44. 
 311. Jackson, supra note 309, at 443–44. 
 312. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19; See Smith, supra note 240, at 1247. 
 313. Of course, it would be possible to have the court-appointed expert teach the court all of 
his or her knowledge in the field of psychology and statistics; however, this would exponentially 
increase the delay of the trial. 
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additional technical training to understand the technical issues at play during a 
taint hearing and would possess a more complete grasp of the issues than could 
be taught to an untrained judge in a timely manner. 
Finally, the appointment of a court-appointed expert would likely achieve 
essentially the same results as the appointment of a special master, except with 
a large increase in delay and a decrease in fairness.  A judge is likely to view 
the expert she appointed as a “super-neutral” “super-expert” and to value her 
expert’s opinion over other experts’ opinions.314  So, first of all, it is likely the 
court-appointed expert’s opinion would be the decision of the court, as would 
be the special master’s opinion, except with the undue delay inherent in 
training the judge in the technical matters.  Additionally, a court-appointed 
expert is not likely to be present during the parties’ experts’ testimony for 
reasons of expense.315  Therefore, the court-appointed expert would lack the 
opportunity to consider the theories of the other experts during their testimony.  
The court-appointed expert would also not have a chance to question the other 
experts.  The special master would be given ample opportunity to witness the 
testimony of the experts and to question the parties’ experts during the taint 
hearing.  This will lead to a more well-informed special master, which will 
lead to fairer decisions about admissibility at taint hearings than could be 
achieved through the use of court-appointed experts.  Finally, the procedural 
aspects of appointing a special master to a taint hearing should be addressed. 
E. Proposed Procedure for the Appointment of a Special Master 
The appointment of a special master in pretrial taint hearings is necessary 
to protect children and defendants alike.316  The master should be selected from 
an impartial group, with knowledge of the psychological issues at play.  Many 
psychologists have recommended “monitoring groups” to watch over experts 
used during the course of a trial,317 and such protections should be in place for 
special masters as well.  Attorneys with psychological training, particularly in 
the field of interviewing, would make the most ideal candidates; however, 
special masters need not be attorneys,318 and it would be inappropriate to so 
 
 314. Developments, supra note 286, at 1591. 
 315. The expert could be present to view all the testimony, but the cost of court-appointed 
experts, borne by the courts, would likely rise quite quickly.  FED. R. EVID. 706(b). 
 316. Both children and defendants will be protected because the special master will be able to 
make a more well-informed decision whether to exclude.  This would decrease the risk that non-
suggestive interviews would be excluded and that suggested interviews would be admitted. 
 317. Lamb & Sternberg, supra note 44, at 821.  Such a group would review licensed 
psychologists and researchers to be sure of professional conduct.  See id.  This would further help 
reduce the chances of “hired gun” psychology.  Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19. 
 318. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003), with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004); see 
also NAFFKY, supra note 279, at § 6. 
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limit the pool of possible special masters in this situation.  Major cities could 
select trained professionals from university researchers or practitioners.  
Smaller jurisdictions will likely still have access to some choice of private 
practitioners or practitioners associated with hospitals.  However, if a 
jurisdiction has no one to fill this position, it would be the duty of the court to 
find an appropriate special master, most likely one selected from a pool of 
candidates maintained in larger jurisdictions. 
Persons chosen to be special masters should, as in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 53, be duly compensated for their time and should be allowed to 
refuse the position.319  The decision of a special master, appointed under these 
circumstances, should be given great deference.  Amended Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 53 now provides for de novo review of the special master’s 
findings,320 while the original allowed only for an abuse of discretion standard 
of review.321  For taint hearings, the decision of a special master should be 
afforded the deference provided under the NCVIA.322  The NCVIA provides 
that findings of fact or conclusions of law of a special master should not be 
overturned unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with [the] law.”323  The NCVIA provides a great 
framework for the rule proposed by this Comment.  It requires referral to a 
special master for vaccine injury cases involving children and provides for 
quite deferential review of the special master’s findings.324  Mandatory referral 
to special masters for taint hearings and deference to the special master’s 
findings are necessary for justice.  The special master is chosen for his or her 
knowledge of psychology and techniques of interviewing that are not within 
the ken of most trial judges; therefore, the judge should take a deferential 
stance to the special master’s findings.  It should “not [be] the practice to 
disturb their findings when they are properly based upon evidence . . . .”325 
Finally, the costs of special masters should be born by the state, at least 
upon a showing of an inability of the defendant to bear the cost. 326  At least 
 
 319. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 advisory committee’s note (stating that 
an expert should be compensated). 
 320. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3) (2004). 
 321. FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 advisory 
committee’s note. 
 322. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(a); see generally Breen, supra note 250. 
 323. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(e)(2)(B) (2000); Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 195 
F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 324. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(a), (c)(6)(E) (2000). 
 325. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).  Although it may turn out that the de novo 
review allowed under Amended Rule 53 will be similarly deferential, for taint hearings, a 
deferential standard should be explicitly set forward. 
 326. A state prosecution of a defendant should bear such a burden for indigent defendants to 
assure that all are guaranteed a fair trial. 
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one state has held that for criminal proceedings, the parties should not and, 
indeed, cannot be forced to bear the costs of a special master.327  Such fees 
were deemed part of the costs of court operations, which must be paid from the 
public funds allocated to the court unless the legislature has specified 
otherwise.328  This would be appropriate for taint hearings to ensure that the 
cost of a properly trained adjudicator is not too great for defendants to bear.  
These procedures may, of course, be experimented with in various 
jurisdictions.  The key now is to begin to put these procedures into place to 
ensure the fair adjudication of charges of sexual abuse against children and to 
protect the rights of children as well. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The trend is that more and more jurisdictions will eventually follow 
Michaels and conduct pretrial taint hearings when an allegation arises that an 
alleged child sexual abuse victim has been interviewed suggestively and that 
child’s testimony should be excluded from trial.  These decisions weigh 
immensely on the success of the prosecution of a sex offender.  Therefore, 
when a taint hearing is ordered, a special master should be appointed to 
oversee the hearing.  The special master should be trained in psychology, 
statistics, experimental methods, and, ideally, in interviewing children.  This 
will allow for the most informed decision on whether or not an interview was 
unduly suggestive, which will work to protect both children and defendants. 
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 327. People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 587 (Cal. 2001); 
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 328. Superior Court, 23 P.3d at 587. 
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